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Abstract
Recently, capital controls have made a comeback as both policymakers and academia have questioned the net
benefits of liberalization and economic growth, especially after the 2008 Great Recession. While that literature has
largely concluded that capital account liberalization may have detrimental effects on growth and accentuate financial
instability in emerging markets, relatively little literature has examined the impacts of capital account liberalization
on income inequality. Thus, this paper investigates the extent to which liberalization is beneficial for countries,
conditional on institutional strength and financial depth. We specifically explore the differential impacts of capital
account liberalization on income inequality during periods of economic expansion and contraction. The main findings
suggest that the net impact of financial liberalization on income inequality is ambiguous during periods of economic
expansion but detrimental during contractions. However, we also find that capital account openness needs not to be
detrimental on income inequality if institutions are strong or - as it is the case in Latin America -if social safety nets
are available.
1 Introduction
Capital openness has long been associated with financial and banking crises. Most recently, the financial crisis raised
concerns among policymakers about the effects of capital openness and the growing income inequality within coun-
tries. This reaction is not baseless: Over the past three decades, increases in financial liberalization and economic
downturns have coincided with income inequality aggravation. In response, there has been an increase in capital con-
trols and the re-regulation of the financial account.1 This return to orthodoxy could be a set back for claimants in favor
and even for those who believe in global coordination.
The troubling decision of choosing sides between closing rather than opening has not been exclusive of policymakers.
Capital controls are making an intellectual comeback, too:
*This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of either the IDB or Boston University. The views expressed in this
Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IDB or Boston University. Working Papers are published to
elicit comments and to further debate. Corresponding author Guillermo LaGarda (glagarda@iadb.org)
1The concept of -capital flow liberalization is used in this paper interchangeably with -capital account liberalization and -financial account liberal-
ization that are used traditionally in the literature
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”The general presumption was that capital account liberalization was always good, and capital controls
were nearly always bad. I’ve seen the thinking change, partly because it was already wrong then, and
because it was particularly wrong in the crisis.”
said Olivier Blanchard, former professor of The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Chief Economist of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As Blanchard said, openness has traditionally been seen as pareto improving
since it expands possibility frontiers. In contrast, closing or restricting the capital account has been seen as detrimental
to countries’ economies. It can, for instance, discourage inward investment, as investors may fear they will not be
able to easily withdraw their money during an economic downturn. This was the case of Iceland, which, during its
2008 financial crisis, imposed capital controls that not only led to colossal outflows, but also crimped investment and
financing for Icelandic companies. Eight years later, the country only now is inching toward eliminating these controls.
But is capital account liberalization the way to go? Claimants of openness have long argued that it increases risk-
sharing and domestic consumption smoothing. However, when financial institutions are weak and access to credit
is not inclusive, liberalization may bias financial access in favor of those better off and therefore increase income
inequality. It could go the other way as well: on the likelihood of financial crises, income inequality could fall as
bankruptcies and falling asset prices may have a greater impact on those with access to financial markets. On the other
hand, long-lasting recessions may disproportionately hurt the poor as they have limited access to banking services to
hedge against risks. Finally, capital account openness may affect the distribution of income through its effect on the
labor share of income. The best way to think of this is in the context of a bargaining game between labor and capital.
If capital account liberalization represents a credible threat to reallocate production abroad, it may lead to an increase
in the profit-wage ratio and to a decrease in the labor share of income.2
The switch to orthodoxy could be partly attributed to the empirical work finding evidence to support the cons over
the pros. Should we change gears and revert capital openness? A surge of discussions addressing this question
suggests that this issue is far from being a closed or even a cold case. Most of the literature focuses on within-
country experience3 or on a limited set of countries4, thus leaving key issues unaddressed.Important questions remain,
including: under what circumstances is capital openness negatively related with income inequality, or if there is
evidence that capital account openness only exacerbates income inequality during downturns and improves it during
economic expansion? Ultimately we would like to answer if there is a right moment to restrict the capital account
during contractions and if these measures should be coordinated worldwide.
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the effects of capital openness on income inequality by examining
the distributional consequences of capital account liberalization for a large (unbalanced) panel of 141 countries from
1990 to 2013. We specifically focus on answering four questions: i) Is there (on average) a positive or negative
relation between income inequality and capital account openness? ii) Are the negative effects of income distribution
larger during booms, busts and/or regular periods? iii) Have ex-ante and ex-post capital openness policies contributed
to reduce income inequality? iv) Can safety nets explain the favorable relationship between capital openness and
income inequality in Latin America? To the best of our knowledge, there is still no research document covering
these issues. Therefore, our research contributes to the literature and also brings to consideration if capital account
liberalization occurred too rapidly relative to the implementation of other policies.
We find that the level of financial development and the occurrence of crises play a key role in shaping the incidence
that financial globalization reforms have on income inequality. In particular, we present evidence that capital account
2Harrison et al. (2002)
3Larrain (2014)
4Das and Mohapatra (2003)
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liberalization reforms are associated with a statistically significant and persistent increase in income inequality ex post
a crisis. However, results are ambiguous during economic expansions. The increase of income inequality is, however,
conditional on the policies that accompanied liberalization reforms. In particular, we find that ex-ante implementation
of social safety nets (specifically conditional cash transfers) reduces the magnitude of negative impact. Closing the
accounts ex post also alleviate the negative effects, albeit, in a lower magnitude.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief summary of the related literature. Section 3
focuses on describing data and showing some descriptive statistics regarding the evolution of inequality and capital
account openness. Section 4 specifies the methodology and is followed by a discussion of results in Section 5. Chapter
6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
A number of studies have found a positive relationship between financial openness and economic growth (Quinn and
Toyoda (2008); Arteta et al. (2001)5; Henry (2006)). However, although financial integration has been historically
associated with positive outcomes in the developed world, the results are mixed for emerging economies. Among
the empirical evidence, Reinhart and Reinhart (2008), using a panel of 181 countries for the period 1960 to 2007,
concluded that periods of high capital flows result in a greater likelihood of subsequent financial and economic crises.
This could be the case for countries with “premature” liberalization, such as Mexico in the mid-90s and several
Asian economies in the late 90s (Glick et al. (2006)), which, after a period of foreign direct investment and portfolio
investment bliss, experienced massive capital outflows. Financial openness has also been detrimental to economies
with distorted domestic markets, as domestic resources were concentrated in less efficient sectors Wang (2002). In
other instances, liberalization has resulted in a minimal increase in inflows, as the case of some African countries6.
More optimistic results are presented in Bussiere and Fratzscher (2008), who, using a panel of 45 advanced and
emerging economies found short-term positive causality between economic growth and income inequality but low
significance in the long-term. Klein and Olivei (2008) find a significant positive effect between financial liberaliza-
tion, financial depth and growth in OECD countries, which suggests that the benefits of financial account openness
are obtained in the presence of institutions and sound macroeconomic policies. Similarly, Prasad and Rajan (2008)
mention that there may be a threshold of institutional development where liberalization costs outweigh the benefits, or
that collateral benefits of liberalization are greater at higher levels of development. Ferreira and Laux (2009), using
a panel of 50 countries from 1988 to 2001, find a positive relationship between portfolio investment and growth in
both developed and emerging economies. In a similar manner, Henry (2003) explores 18 episodes of equity market
liberalization and find benefits reflected in the cost of capital, accumulation of capital stock and output growth per
worker. Finally, in a recent discussion,Quinn and Toyoda (2008) identified significant causality between equity market
liberalization and economic growth. This statistical ambiguity is also present at the theoretical level. In principle,
improved access to private savings would allow a more efficient selection of investment and thus induce growth in
the recipient country. However, distortions could limit the benefits of integration in several instances, as argued in
Hellmann et al. (2000). A similar case of information asymmetries is presented in McKinnon and Pill (1996). Even
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) show limited benefits of transitioning from an autarkic state to an open economy, with
regards to improvements in domestic productivity.
5However, the effects vary with time
6Kose and Prasad (2012)
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A less researched topic is the relationship between financial liberalization and income inequality. Claessens and Perotti
(2007) explore how political influence encourages liberalization reforms that improve the financial access of the elite.
This induces inequality because the benefits of openness are absorbed by the elites while risks are assimilated by
the rest of the population. The authors concluded that financial reforms are only beneficial when accompanied by
supervisory institutions. Similarly, Bumann and Lensink (2016) develop a theoretical model of the banking sector
and explore two types of countries: one with more financial depth than the other. Liberalization reduces credit costs,
driving demand for loans and raising interest rates to attract savings deposits. This improves income distribution.
Empirically, the authors prove that the direct relationship between openness and inequality is positive, but that it is
subject to financial depth. Our research complements the above findings. In addition to incorporating institutional
components and financial depth into our analysis, we explore atypical economic events. This allows us to confirm if
capital account liberalization is beneficial in absence of an atypical economic cycle. This method is different from
Bumman and Lensink’s, who do not account for economic booms or busts.
Furceri (2015) proposes a similar approach with objectives different from ours: The author estimated a dynamic panel
using an exogenous monetary shock. However their goal is to document the resulting multipliers from the impulse-
response function. They find that after a monetary shock, inequality and labor share of income reduces both in the short
and medium term. His results suggest that the largest increases in income inequality occurred in countries with weaker
financial institutions and when followed by financial crises. Atkinson and Morelli (2011) also sought to quantify the
changes in income distribution during atypical periods-crises. However, unlike this paper and that of Furceri (2015),
they did not control for financial openness. They conclude that there are no consistent patterns within the sample. This
is because a crisis can encourage the creation of policies that permanently change the level of income inequality, such
as the creation of the Social Security program in the United States after the 1929 depression.
Larrain (2014) links financial openness with the labor market. Liberalization allows financially constrained companies
to receive capital. Since capital and skilled labor are relative complements, there is an increase in the relative demand
for skilled labor, thus resulting in an uneven salary increase. Larrain’s hypothesis is confirmed using industry-level
data for 20 European countries. Our methodology does not include correlations between financial liberalization and
increases in skilled labor (or relative wages); at least not explicitly. However, we include in our estimations schooling
and trade openness to account for wage-skill differentials.
Arora et al. (2013), Gallagher et al. (2012), and Helleiner (2011) discuss the role of international coordination and
global governance. Their common denominator is that capital openness requires comprehensive planning. Liberal-
ization polices should be timed and sequenced in order to ensure that their benefits outweigh their costs. Contrary
to other academic research, they consider that financial liberalization policies should be designed as a function of
both domestic and multilateral effects. Appropriate policy responses comprise a range of measures and involve, both,
countries that are senders and recipients of capital flows. Our investigation does not test hypotheses on the degree of
financial linkages within countries or discuss the direct effects of international assistance by multilaterals. However,
our findings encourage the request for better coordination that may help minimize the detrimental effects on income
distribution that greater financial openness may bring.
3 Measures and Correlations
The current section explains all of the variables used in our model and their relationships with one another.
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Income Inequality
The Gini coefficient is the most widely used measure of income inequality. The Standardized World Income Inequal-
ity Database (SWIID) (Solt (2014)) contains post-tax income estimates represented in 100 separate imputations per
country. For simplification purposes, we averaged the 100 imputations for each country, per year. Figure 1a shows
time series for seven world regions. Income inequality has increased in most countries, especially in the developed
economies. Interestingly though, in Latin America, the most unequal region of the world, income distribution seems
to be improving, even after the late 90s when the large countries region experienced recessions. Figure 1b shows all
countries divided by income groups. Once again, high-income countries seem to have the worst trend. Low-income
countries seem to be the least affected, possibly because of the countries’ fewer linkages with the global economy.
Figure 1: Inequality Measured by Gini Coefficient
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Capital Account Liberalization
Capital Account liberalization de jure measures are typically constructed from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), which measures over 60 different types of controls. Measures
typically result in binary variables where 1 equals the presence of financial controls, and 0 otherwise. One such de jure
measure is the Chinn-Ito index, which has been fine-tuned for the extent of openness in capital account transactions.7
It does not, however, measure the intensity of capital controls as Quinn (1997) and Quinn (2003) do. Chinn-Ito’s
correlation with Quinn, though, is 0.84, suggesting that it captures capital control intensity to a reasonable extent.
Ferna´ndez et al. (2015) recently developed a de jure dataset (KA-Uribe hereafter) using AREAER and the methodol-
ogy in Schindler (2009). The dataset offers information on capital controls that are disaggregated both by type (i.e.
whether the controls are on inflows or outflows) , and by 10 different categories of assets, including money market
instruments; derivatives; collective investment securities; guarantees, sureties, and financial back-up facilities; and
direct investment accounts. KA-Uribe construct an index from these data that ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 is equivalent
to a capital account lacking restrictions, while 1 is equivalent to a fully ”closed” account. The correlation between
KA-Uribe and the Chinn-Ito index stands strong at -0.87. It is important to recall that it is normal that the Chinn-Ito
index and KA-Uribe move in opposite directions, because in the former, the maximum value is equivalent to a fully
liberalized account, while in the latter, the maximum value is equivalent to a fully restricted account.
Several de facto measures have also been generated in response to de jure measures’ shortcomings. Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007), proposed a stock-based de facto database that captures a country’s exposure to international financial
markets. It includes countries’ aggregate assets and liabilities in the following categories: portfolio equity, foreign
direct investment, debt, and financial derivatives. For this paper, we summed all portfolio investment and debt assets
and liabilities8, as a percentage of GDP. The resulting “index” was used as a de facto measure. It should be noted that
gross capital flows are more volatile than equity based measures (Quinn et al. (2011)) 9.
For our empirical analysis, we considered both de jure and de facto measures, as many countries legally allow capital
account transactions but do not receive flows.10 Only a handful of countries with liberalized capital accounts receive
a high percentage of capital flows. Therefore, utilizing only de jure measures could bias results. Similarly, omitting
variables that explain the difference between the degree of de jure and de facto liberalization could cause heterogeneity
issues if we only use de facto measures. To reduce the possibility of omitting these variables, we used additional
controls, including depth of financial system (i.e.: credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP) and institution
strength.
It should be noted that having a closed capital account does not guarantee a lack of investment flows into a country
either. For instance, direct investment and funds recorded as ”other investment” in the balance of payments can enter a
country through the banking system or any other mean offered by the central bank. However, this research focuses on
portfolio investment flows. It would be unlikely to find a situation where portfolio investment enters a country without
a de jure framework that allows for it.
7Chinn and Ito (2008) argue that this index could be used as a proxy for strength of capital controls
8Flows
9These measures usually suffer from endogeneity and may not reflect changes induced by policies.
10A scatterplot of Chinn-Ito vs. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti shown in the Annex, provides evidence for this argument.
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Relationship between Financial Liberalization and Income Inequality
A quick glance at our panel shows that the Chinn-Ito and the Gini coefficient are negatively correlated. In other words:
the opening of the capital account is associated with a reduction in income inequality. However, this correlation is
rather weak (-0.15). The effect of openness is also beneficial (but weaker) when comparing the Ferna´ndez-Uribe index
to the Gini coefficient. As mentioned above, considering only de jure measures can provide an inaccurate picture of
reality. Therefore, we also evaluated the relationship between capital flows (as a percentage of GDP) from the Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti database and the Gini index. The result (-0.07), although very weak, also suggests that a greater
amount of capital flows is associated with a fall in income inequality.
These correlations contrast with the econometric findings in the literature - a proof that the effects of financial openness
on inequality are not uniform across countries.There is clearly more to explore than just a simple correlation. Some of
the reasons for this contrasting effects discussed in the literature include political, institutional and market efficiency
differences. While the reasons are many, researchers seem to agree on the role of institutions, as countries with solid
institutions usually have a higher penetration of financial services. To control for institutions, we assume that the
degree of institutional strength is correlated with GDP per capita. Thus, we classified countries into three income
groups: high income, middle income and low income based on the following rule11:
IncomeGroup12 =
{ Low if GDPpc < 4, 999
Middle if 5, 000 ≤ GDPpc < 19, 999
High if GDPpc ≥ 20, 000
Correlations by income group, although generally weak, vary significantly. For instance: while the correlation be-
tween the Chinn-Ito index and Gini is negative for the entire panel, it is positive (although weak) for the low and
middle income groups, implying that only high income groups have benefited (in terms of inequality reduction) from
liberalizing their capital account.
In addition to income groups, we further disaggregated the panel into three periods that we consider fundamentally
different from each other: 1990-1999; 2000-2007; and 2008-2013. Between 1990 and 1999, more than 80 countries
opened their capital accounts. However, it was actually starting in 2000 that de facto openness accelerated. Finally,
2008marks the beginning of the Great Recession13. This additional disaggregation allowed us to visualize whether
there were characteristics between income groups and over time that contrast the aforementioned correlations.
Correlations by time period also show inconsistent results: for the high income group, the relationship between capital
account liberalization (using Chinn-Ito) and income inequality is unfavorable during most periods14: that is, that
capital account liberalization is associated with an increase in income inequality. The correlations are even stronger
when using the Fernandez-Uribe index. We run a final check by exploring the relationship between Gini and the lags
of each of the de jure measures, given that the Gini coefficient usually reports the previous year’s inequality. However,
correlations remain virtually identical to those found with their contemporary values.
We also explored the relationship between our de facto measure and income inequality by income groups. For these
11We used GDP per capita, PPP, constant 2011 international dollars from the World Bank.
12The rule above allowed us to account for countries’ transitions between groups throughout time. For a detailed list of countries by income group,
please see the Annex
13According to the U.S. NBER, the great recession started in December 2007. Given that the panel contains annual data, we marked 2008 as the
start of the recession
14Except for the low and middle income groups during 1990-1999, where the relationship is practically inexistent
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correlations, we used the lag of the de facto measure, for reasons mentioned above. The results are ambiguous:
liberalization is usually unfavorable for low and middle income countries15, but is beneficial to high-income countries.
This correlation, along with the correlations mentioned above, are consistent with the arguments of Klein and Olivei
(2008) and Prasad and Rajan (2008) on the importance of the strength of institutions for a beneficial reception of
capital flows.
Relevant Shocks
The academic literature has identified several shocks that may have an effect on the reduction of income inequality. For
purposes of our study, we focused on impacts that are transmitted through portfolio investment. Monetary policy in
particular (Coibion et al. (2012)), can have global effects that are reflected in the cost of capital. An exogenous shock
that suddenly increases liquidity and persistently maintains low rates can generate changes in investment patterns.
In this case, income inequality could improve or worsen, depending on the sector of the economy that absorbs the
benefits. The reasoning behind this is that most households primarily rely on labor earnings instead of business and
financial income. If expansionary monetary policy shocks raise profits more than wages, then those with claims to
ownership of firms will tend to benefit disproportionately. Since these people also tend to be wealthier, this channel
should lead to higher income inequality in response to monetary policy shocks. Also, if some agents frequently trade
in financial markets and are affected by changes in the money supply prior to other agents, then an increase in the
money supply will redistribute wealth toward those agents most connected to financial markets.
Another variety of shocks could be related to internal conditions that suddenly change from optimistic to pessimistic,
such as the difference between growth expectations and the actual GDP growth rate. Although there is usually much
correlation between this variable and other factors, and while this variable is not the best representation of a domestic
shock, it allows for the estimation of an orthogonal component to external factors. In addition, this difference between
expectations and reality may be interacting with the capital account liberalization policy or with de facto capital
flows. Finally, including this variable into our analysis could be interesting as it allows us to see the effect that an
underperforming economy16 has on income distribution during periods of capital account liberalization.
We thus control for these two types of shocks by including the following variables into our analysis:
• Romer and Romer (2004) (hereinafter RR) shocks, which reflect changes in U.S. monetary policy (agreed at
each Federal Open Market Committee meeting) which are orthogonal to the set of information from the Fed,
obtained from the GREENBOOK forecasts. This variable can be used to identify monetary policy innovations
purged from anticipated effects related to economic conditions.
• To characterize unusual economic episodes we generated a proxy variable that is only weakly correlated with
world economic performance, represented by matrix Yi,t. To do so we used the real GDP growth rate of each
country, yi,t, and projected to current and lagged GDP growth of U.S., Japan, Germany, and China17. The
estimation results are then used to to find the forecast error, si,t, the proxy we seek:
yi,t = θ + w
′Yi,t + i,t,
ˆyi,t = θˆ + wˆ
′Yi,t,
15Except for middle-income countries from 2008-2013.
16That is, performing slower than expected
17China’s GDP and lagged GDP is only included from 2004-on
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si,t = yi,t − ˆyi,t.
• We also used a simple categorization of GDP growth performance: regular episode whenever GDP growth is
within a 1.5 (historical) standard deviation, boom when it is above, and bust when it is below.
UnusualEvent =
{ Bust if GDPg < µi − 1.5σi
Regular if µi − 1.5σi ≤ GDPg ≤ µi + 1.5σi
Boom if GDPg > µi + 1.5σi
4 Methodology
We first performed a baseline estimation that inherits some elements from Bumann and Lensink (2016) as well as
Furceri (2015). We then improved the baseline estimations by adding variables that we believe are useful in the
identification of unusual economic episodes. Doing so allowed for a better understanding of correlations and helped
identify the direction of causality between capital account openness and income inequality over different time periods.
We focused on answering four questions: i) If, on average, there is a positive or negative relation between income
inequality and capital account openness; ii) whether or not the negative effects of income distribution are larger during
boom, busts, and/or regular periods; iii) if ex-ante and ex-post capital openness policies have contributed to reduce in-
come inequality, and iv) if safety nets explain the observed correlation between capital openness and income inequality
in Latin America.
To address the above we begin describing the general econometric model:
gi,t = φi + ϕt + ρgi,t−1 + αki,t +X
′
i,tβ + [X
′
i,tλ]ki,t + Z
′
i,tγ + [Z
′
i,tλ]ki,t + εi,t. (1)
In this equation, i = 1, . . . , N y t = 1, . . . , T are indices for country and time, respectively. The variable g is our
measure for income inequality –the gini coefficient. φi and ϕt are fixed effects for country and time, respectively. We
included the lag of the gini coefficient as explanatory variable to take into account the persistence of inequality that is
observed in the data. k corresponds to the capital openness indicator. X is a matrix corresponding to variables usually
associated with inequality changes. Z is a matrix including a set of controls usually associated with shocks or atypical
economic performance.
X includes inflation, trade openness, financial depth, age dependency ratio and secondary education enrollment as
control variables. Academic research has identified these variables as key correlates of income equality. Some of the
arguments are listed as follows: 18
1. Low-income households normally keep a large percentage of their income in cash to buy goods. Thus, they
are more likely to be affected by a generalized increase of prices.19 However, the effect of price level changes
on income inequality might be conditional on the capacity of household to shield against them, (through the
banking system, for instance). Therefore we add credit to the private sector as % of GDP as a measure of
financial depth.
18Bumann and Lensink (2016) include a complete discussion on the selection of these variables.
19Albanesi (2007)
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2. Trade openness might also be a channel inducing income inequality, as trade flows could cause sudden changes
in the relative demand of high skilled workers. In the absence of migration policies or an adequate education
system, these trade flows could cause a rise of relative wages thus increasing income inequality.20
3. Education deficiencies may also induce income inequality as education levels could create wage differentials.21
4. A country’s age structure may also have an effect on income inequality. For instance, inequality could be lower
among retirees (but so is their average income).22
Unlike Bumann and Lensink (2016), we did not include GDP per capita as a proxy for development of institutions.
Instead, we grouped the countries by income level, as explained in the previous chapter. This allows us to indirectly
control for institutions without having to regress on one additional variable.
Searching for Answers
To better answer question i), we performed two rounds of estimations. First we consider only linear effects regressing
on each element of Xi,t incrementally:
gi,t = φi + ϕt + ρgi,t−1 + αki,t +X
′
i,tβ + εi,t. (2)
Then we performed additional estimations involving non-linear effects. These estimations test if conditional on the
prevailing state of secondary enrollment rate, inflation, age dependency ratio, trade openness, or financial depth, the
marginal effect of a change in capital openness on inequality is larger than the linear estimates. We therefore expand
equation (2) by adding a an interaction variable. The overall effect of capital account openness has two components,
a direct (α) and an indirect (λ) effect on income inequality:
gi,t = φi + ϕt + ρgi,t−1 + αki,t +X
′
i,tβ + [X
′
i,tλ]ki,t + εi,t. (3)
To address question ii), we follow three approaches. The first one simply assumes that an unusual episode (Z) has
a one-to-one correspondence with higher values of the RR indicator. To briefly recapitulate, RR is large when the
increase of interest rates is higher than the expected. We associate higher RR values to an unusual episode, which
surprises the world economy as a whole. The second scenario uses domestic real GDP growth to assess if a country is
facing a slowdown that is only weakly correlated with world economic performance. The third assumption is a simple
categorization of GDP growth performance. Equation (4) represents these set of estimations:
gi,t = φi + ϕt + ρgi,t−1 + αki,t +X
′
i,tβ + Z
′
i,tγ + [X
′
i,tλ]ki,t + εi,t. (4)
To investigate our third topic we categorized the magnitude of changes in our capital openness variable. First, we
understand that a liberalization policy occurred whenever there was a positive change on ki,t between t − 1 and t.
Otherwise, the policy remained unchanged (”none”) or had a negative change (”close”):
20Anderson (2005)
21Goldin and Katz (2007)
22Alesina and Perotti (1996)
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Policy = {
Close if 4ki,t < 0
None if 4ki,t = 0
Open if 4ki,t > 0
We then use these variables to answer if income distribution improves:
gi,t = φi + ϕt + ρgi,t−1 + αki,t + Policy
′
i,tη +X
′
i,tβ + Policy
′
i,t[Z
′
i,tλ] + εi,t. (5)
5 Results and Discussion
Table 1 in the annex shows the results after estimating equations (2) and (3) for the entire panel. As it is customary,
each column adds an explanatory control. The final column includes the interaction term. The results overall show
a positive and statistically significant coefficient for Capital Account Openness (KA hereafter). Interestingly, the
magnitude and significance of the KA coefficient increased as we added controls. According to these outputs, capital
openness-when controlling for inflation, age structure, trade openness and secondary enrollment-is associated with a
0.9-point increase in the Gini coefficient. But this should not surprise us at all. Schooling differentials, increases on
price level, or the wage polarization potentially induced by trade have been extensively discussed as being conducive to
higher income inequality. The estimations also confirm the beneficial effects of a developed financial system. The role
of financial depth, measured by credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP is significant, both the linear and
the non-linear component. The keynote here is the two-piece decomposition of the total effect on income inequality of
opening the capital account. On the one side, the marginal effect of opening the capital account increases inequality by
1.7 points. On the other, financial depth alleviates the detrimental effects the as indicated by the significant coefficient
on the interaction term. More precisely, the negative sign implies that the greater the financial depth, the smaller (less
detrimental) the effect of capital account liberalization on income inequality will be.
An interesting question to ask is if the sign of the correlations between these two variables is conditional on institutional
factors or income. Grouping by income is handy as it proxies both, per capita income and quality of institutions. By
doing so we implicitly constrain the distribution of the other factors for instance:23 i) most of the observations with a
private credit ratio below 25 percent come from low income and middle income countries; ii) high school enrollment
rate is usually below 44 percent in low income countries, and so on. Since there are significant differences between
income groups, using the entire panel for our analysis will not provide an accurate picture of reality: a closer look
at KA and inequality’s evolution over the years shows that, while a number of countries have opened their capital
account, inequality has generally remained the same. This trend is confirmed when separating countries by income
groups (using the criteria specified in the methodology section): the median Gini coefficient moved very little in 20
years (1990-2010).
Capital openness is again associated with increased inequality when controlling for income groups. Although our
findings suggest that low income is associated with lower statistically significant correlations24 we still see the same
patterns as before. Financial development remains a relevant variable to consider in the analysis, and in every case,
there is some kind of beneficial effect as depth increases. Regressions per income group are shown in Tables 2-4 in
the annex. Incremental regressions show evidence of KA losing significance in low-income countries. However, this
23Tables 12-15 in the Annex have summary statistic tables per income group
24It is important to note that low income countries tend to be less unequal and receive less capital flows relative to other income groups.
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fact is not surprising at all. As shown in Table 13, low income countries, regardless of their de jure openness, their
actual portfolio flows as a percentage of GDP (variable de facto in the table) are rather small, which also explains the
implicit high p-values of Table 2. When using Fernandez-Uribe (KA-Uribe hereafter), then the coefficient becomes
positive and significant between 5% and 10%. However, this might not be the best indicator for low income countries
as their data has plenty of missing values.
In middle income countries, capital openness loses significance (single effect), albeit the indirect effect generated
by conditioning capital account openness to financial depth is significant at 10% remains valid when conditioning
on financial depth (Table 3). In the former case, the coefficient changed from negative to positive as we added the
canonical controls. In the latter, the marginal effect is -0.025, implying that financial development is associated with
better income distribution. When using KA-Uribe (Table 6), the results show a different story. First, the direct effect
is -1.83 significant at 10%, which should be read as increasing inequality. The indirect effect is 0.035 per level of
financial depth, which means that financial development reduces the negative effects on income distribution (Recall
that KA and KA-Uribe move in opposite direction). The larger and most significant effects are registered in the high-
income countries. High-income countries are usually financially more developed so correlations are stronger in each
case (Table 4). For instance when regressing on KA, we find that capital account openness is associated with a 2.01-
point increase in income inequality. The interaction term renders a negative coefficient that has significance at only
12%. The low significance of financial depth might not be totally unreasonable: in high income countries, there are no
meaningful differences in terms of financial development, which would explain lower correlations. Similarly, when
using KA-Uribe, (Table 7) the coefficient is negative and significant at 5% (recall that negative here means increasing
inequality). The interaction term increases significance to 5%.
Timing Matters
The first question that we seek to answer is whether or not unusual economic conditions have a particular effect on the
correlation between capital openness and income inequality. To progress on this, we estimate a parsimonious version
of equation (3) including the lag of Gini, the usual controls, capital openness, and a variable representing the unusual
events. We are particularly interested on the marginal effect of capital openness on the Gini:
dgi,t
dki,t
= α+ λZi,t. (6)
The estimations resulted in three main findings. First, global exogenous shock -monetary as RR, increases the level
of detriment of income distribution. Second, whenever an unusual economic performance is more correlated to the
global economic cycles, the negative effects on income distribution magnify. Third, during regular cycles and booms
the effect of capital openness on inequality is usually beneficial but not totally conclusive. However, capital openness
is unambiguously worse for income equality during bust. Table 8 show the summarized output of these regressions,
where each column corresponds to baseline, RR, forecast errors of GDP growth, and the categorized growth perfor-
mance, respectively. The sign of dgi,tdki,t depends on a direct and indirect effect. We find evidence that controlling by
monetary shock, the direct marginal effect, α is detrimental on income inequality. Moreover, the size of the shock
plays an important role by increasing income inequality through a coefficient of 0.4. We did find weak statistical
evidence to argue a possible conditional effect λ, impact of 0.14 but only with p-values between 10% and 15%. The
RR shock is linked to how developed is the financial system, therefore, we would expect that its effect on inequality
is larger in lower and middle income countries compared to high-income, however there was no strong evidence to
support this.
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Next, we take a look at the spikes on growth rates that are not explained directly by performance in large economies.
While the marginal effect of these measures on inequality had low explanatory power on income inequality (see Table
8), the interaction term was significant. In fact, according to the estimation outputs, capital openness direct effect,
α, remained positively and significantly correlated with inequality. Furthermore, as atypical economic performances
depart from global cycles, capital account openness correlates negatively with inequality, suggesting the existence of
a magnifying effect whenever the global economies are the main cause of an atypical event.
Finally, we find evidence of increased inequality during bust. Table 8 shows how the total marginal effect (equation
4) of capital openness is larger when controlling for an economic contraction (variable ”bust”). Economic expansions
(”Booms in the contrary resulted in negative coefficients implying a beneficial effect on income distribution. However,
the significance level of both the interaction term and the direct effect is not as good as we would expect, with p-values
within 12%-20%. Our finding prove evidence that openness is more likely to be bad for income distribution during
busts, but it is silent about its performance during booms. This conclusion is valid even if we relaxed the definition of
boom and bust to 0.5 standard deviation from GDP growth’s mean.
To Restrict or Not To Restrict?
Controls on capital account transactions represent a country’s attempt to shield itself from risks associated with fluc-
tuations in international capital flows. Capital controls take on special circumstances, for instance in the context of
a fixed exchange rate regime. In a country with a fragile banking system, for instance, allowing households to in-
vest abroad freely could precipitate an exodus of domestic savings and jeopardize the banking system’s viability. And
short-term capital inflows can be quickly reversed when a country is hit with an adverse macroeconomic shock, thereby
amplifying its macroeconomic effect. In theory, capital account liberalization should allow for more efficient global
allocation of capital, from capital-rich industrial countries to capital-poor developing economies. This should have
widespread benefits-by providing a higher rate of return on people’s savings in industrial countries and by increasing
growth, employment opportunities, and living standards in developing countries. Access to capital markets should
allow countries to “insure” themselves to some extent against fluctuations in their national incomes such that national
consumption levels are relatively less volatile. Since good and bad times often are not synchronized across countries,
capital flows can, to some extent, offset volatility in countries’ own national incomes.
The evidence, as we have seen, is not quite as compelling as the theory, however. Middle income countries that have
liberalized their capital accounts typically have had questionable improvement on inequality. According to our findings
this is associated to the swings in the domestic and world economy, thereby magnifying the negative effects. Is there
actually evidence of the goodness of closing the external accounts? Taking into account the whole panel we tested
whether or not closing the capital account was significantly followed by periods with lower inequality. Table 9 shows
the outputs of this estimation. The coefficients broadly keep the same patterns as baseline. However, our indicator
dummy for closing policy has a negative sign, which implies that it is significantly related to lower income inequality.
The next column presents the interaction of a change in policy and a shock. The interpretation would be as follow:
the sign of the coefficient imply that closing the account posterior to a shock reduces the negative effects on income
distribution. However, this result could as well be not conclusive since during recovery periods governments usually
expand their social spending through transfers that may hide the real impact. Notwithstanding, this result opens the
door to explore the role of safety nets as policy instruments to mitigate the negative effects during bad times.
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The Role of Safety Nets: Lessons from Latin America?
Like in many other emerging regions, income inequality is one of the top malaises of Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC). In fact, it is the most unequal region in the world, according to the IMF, ECLAC, and WEF. However, the region
has made progress in closing the income gap: in our panel, the region’s Gini coefficient went from 50.1 in 1995 to 43.8
in 2013. Most LAC countries in our panel belong to the middle income group. The results presented in the previous
chapter show that in middle income countries, the opening of capital account is associated with a drop in the Gini
coefficient; however, the results are either not statistically significant or weakly significant. What factor(s) could be
encouraging the fall of income inequality in these countries? One possible explanation is the existence of programs
of redistributive nature, such as cash transfer programs. In theory, these programs should be even more beneficial
if they encourage recipients to educate themselves and/or to improve their quality of life, such as with conditional
cash transfer (CCT) programs. Soares et al. (2009) explored this issue and found that countries with highly focalized
CCT programs (i.e.: Brazil and Mexico) experienced a 21 percent reduction in income inequality, and a 15 percent
decrease in Chile, which has a less focalized program. We therefore considered that controlling for CCT programs
could possibly explain this favorable relationship between capital account openness and income distribution in LAC.
Using data from ECLAC, the IDB, the World Bank and various LAC government offices, we constructed a binary
database indicating the existence (or lack) of CCT programs. In our panel, 21 out of 26 Latin American countries
have implemented (or had, at some point) at least one CCT. We included this binary variable in our baseline model,
and created an interaction term between capital openness and the binary CCT variable. When these two variables are
included in the baseline regression, the Chinn-Ito index becomes statistically significant and is associated with the fall
in inequality in LAC. Similarly, the binary CCT variable is also statistically significant in explaining the fall in income
inequality. However, the interaction between these two shows the opposite: it implies that greater capital account
openness in the presence of a CCT, is associated with an increase in income inequality.
Note that these estimates could be biased for several reasons: for example, some of the CCTs may have low coverage
and may not benefit the neediest. Another reason could be a delay in time when the program starts relative to the time
when the first disbursement occurs. In addition, many of the programs start with a pilot region, and, if successful,
beneficiaries are gradually added. Ideally, the binary CCT variable should be adjusted to reflect the first disbursement.
However, not all LAC countries report the date of the first disbursement. To control for low coverage, we use coverage
data compiled by Stampini and Tornarolli (2012). The information was generated by directly obtaining the coverage
data from each country’s social development ministry. While the dataset is rich in content, it also contains missing
values that we interpolated where possible. In addition, we created a variable for “program age”, to control for program
effectiveness. The instrument is weak; however, the oldest CCT programs in Latin America, Oportunidades (Mexico)
and Bolsa Familia (Brazil), have been identified as highly efficient on numerous reports.
What can we say about safety nets in Latin America and capital openness? Table 11 shows a simple exercise to support
our argument. The impact coefficients (KA) are positive but reduce their magnitude after controlling for coverage of
CCTs. As expected, the effect of capital openness conditional on coverage renders a positive estimate. This enforces
the previous claim, that safety nets help mitigate the negative effects that we usually see during economic cycles. Table
10 uses the age of the program as an instrument of effectiveness (see paragraph above). The estimates have the same
sign and significance as coverage. Are safety net programs the secret to seize all benefits from financial liberalization?
Our results seem to imply yes. Latin America is no stranger to financial instability and recurrent crisis, yet inequality
has been decreasing. It seems that adoption of CCTs translates into a very useful ex-ante type of policy to reduce
the negative effects that an open financial account could have. Nonetheless, it would be interesting to analyze the
interaction of booms and busts with safety nets. However, the current availability of data is not enough to test these
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hypotheses –a bigger data set would provide better inference. Further research should aim at clarifying different
questions regarding the role of safety nets and financial liberalization. 25
6 Conclusions
Literature has largely concluded that capital account liberalization may have negative effects on growth through fi-
nancial instability in emerging markets. Moreover, the links between economic and financial distress and income
inequality have also been frequently revisited, especially in the last decade. In this paper, we attempt to build upon
these two literatures to examine the extent to which capital account liberalization is associated with income inequality
in emerging market and developing countries. We confirm earlier studies that show there is such a relationship be-
tween increased capital account openness and increases in income inequality, and that capital account regulations are
associated with less income inequality—at least for emerging economies. We expand on these findings to learn that
there are differential impacts of capital account liberalization on inequality during periods of economic expansion and
contraction. The impact of financial liberalization on income inequality is ambiguous during economic expansions,
whereas during contractions, capital account liberalization appears to exacerbate income inequality. Strong institutions
and financial depth are key factors determining the extent of the negative impacts. One possible reason behind this is
that financial services may provide households with better risk sharing and the possibility of shield against economic
swings. Furthermore, our findings suggest that when a country decides to implement regulations to slow and steer
financial flows during atypical economic events, the detrimental effects on income distributions diminish. These find-
ings offer supportive ground in favor of counter-cyclical, temporary, and flexible ’speed bumps’ during sudden stops or
similar atypical events. However, this result might not be as strong since countries usually implement social policies
simultaneously.
Finally, it is conceivable that for most developing countries, where institutions are weak, the absence of ex-ante
policies imply that capital account liberalization will probably increase income inequality during periods of economic
contraction. In order to ensure dignifying living conditions, it seems relevant to implement additional protection
measures for the initially disadvantaged groups as seems to be the case of Latin America. Thus, further work is required
to explain whether or not CCTs are behind these observed differences and if liberalization should be synchronized with
social safety net coverage.
The findings discussed in this paper bring to consideration two kinds of policies. On the one hand, policies geared
to seize the positive spillovers of openness during economic expansion, albeit designed such that they can also act as
safety nets during contractions. On the other hand, our findings support resorting to capital restrictions during busts
especially if social safety nets have low coverage. For most developing countries, where institutions are weak, the
absence of safety net policies implies that a capital account liberalization will likely increase income inequality. In
order to ensure dignifying living conditions, it seems relevant to implement additional protection measures for the
initially disadvantaged groups as seems to be the case of Latin America.
25We are currently constructing a larger world data set with coverage information that should allow for an interesting analysis. For now however,
these results provide some evidence on the relevance of implementing additional protection measures for the initially disadvantaged groups before
opening the accounts.
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7 Annex
Figure 2: Relationship between de jure and de facto Measures
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Table 1: Baseline Regression, Arellano-Bover
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini Lag 0.725∗∗ 0.749∗∗ 0.733∗∗ 0.728∗∗
(59.65) (40.18) (40.10) (39.58)
KA 0.233 0.923∗∗ 1.122∗∗ 1.739∗∗
(1.59) (3.70) (4.45) (4.89)
Inflation 0.00283∗∗ 0.00281∗∗ 0.00296∗∗
(3.88) (3.87) (4.06)
Trade -0.0216∗∗ -0.0196∗∗ -0.0199∗∗
(-11.32) (-10.07) (-10.22)
School Enrollment -0.0112∗∗ -0.0141∗∗ -0.0137∗∗
(-2.74) (-3.33) (-3.22)
Age dependency -0.0145+ -0.00405 0.00169
(-1.94) (-0.53) (0.21)
Private Credit to GDP -0.00801∗∗ -0.0166∗∗
(-5.24) (-4.38)
KA*PrivCredit -0.0105∗
(-2.49)
Constant 11.55∗∗ 13.45∗∗ 12.99∗∗ 12.42∗∗
(22.04) (13.88) (13.24) (12.32)
Observations 2438 1722 1664 1664
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2: Baseline Regression, low income countries. Arellano-
Bover
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini Lag 0.904∗∗ 0.933∗∗ 0.916∗∗ 0.914∗∗
(19.20) (14.94) (16.76) (15.99)
KA -1.252+ -0.823 -0.448 -0.482
(-1.65) (-0.92) (-0.46) (-0.36)
Inflation -0.00998 -0.00593 -0.00525
(-1.05) (-0.69) (-0.61)
Trade -0.0275∗∗ -0.0259∗∗ -0.0262∗∗
(-3.65) (-2.93) (-2.76)
School Enrollment -0.0262 -0.0535∗ -0.0539∗
(-1.08) (-2.01) (-2.05)
Age Dependency -0.0572+ -0.102∗∗ -0.103∗∗
(-1.72) (-2.65) (-2.60)
Private Credit to GDP -0.0274+ -0.0283
(-1.96) (-1.37)
KA*PrivCredit 0.000142
(0.00)
Constant 4.528∗ 10.71∗∗ 16.49∗∗ 16.72∗∗
(2.10) (2.59) (3.17) (2.95)
Observations 790 422 403 403
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3: Baseline Regression, Middle income
countries. Arellano-Bover
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini Lag 0.807∗∗ 0.784∗∗ 0.770∗∗ 0.767∗∗
(23.37) (14.81) (14.33) (14.42)
KA -0.702 -0.509 -0.345 0.631
(-1.59) (-0.69) (-0.51) (0.74)
Inflation 0.000894∗ 0.00122∗∗ 0.00138∗∗
(2.40) (2.81) (3.10)
Trade -0.00314 -0.00753 -0.00680
(-0.41) (-1.32) (-1.16)
School Enrollment 0.00689 0.00793 0.00749
(0.47) (0.56) (0.54)
Age Dependency 0.0317 0.0455+ 0.0485+
(1.46) (1.82) (1.95)
Private Credit to GDP 0.0116 0.0220
(1.18) (1.58)
KA*PrivCredit -0.0249+
(-1.64)
Constant 8.844∗∗ 7.615∗∗ 7.167∗∗ 6.669∗
(6.01) (3.21) (2.88) (2.55)
Observations 914 665 662 662
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4: Baseline Regression, High income countries. Arellano-
Bover
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini Lag 0.872∗∗ 0.792∗∗ 0.764∗∗ 0.763∗∗
(29.12) (16.07) (14.42) (14.42)
KA 0.335 1.210∗∗ 0.920∗∗ 2.078∗
(0.66) (3.23) (2.96) (2.13)
Inflation 0.0177∗∗ 0.0170∗∗ 0.0172∗∗
(7.80) (6.09) (6.25)
Trade -0.00644 -0.00511 -0.00494
(-1.31) (-1.12) (-1.09)
School Enrollment -0.0199∗ -0.0194∗ -0.0227∗
(-2.57) (-2.43) (-2.53)
Age dependency 0.0263 0.0317 0.0408
(1.38) (1.42) (1.58)
Private Credit to GDP 0.00309 0.0118
(1.24) (1.59)
KA*PrivCredit -0.0104
(-1.48)
Constant 4.832∗∗ 8.290∗∗ 8.886∗∗ 7.891∗∗
(5.26) (4.54) (5.07) (4.98)
Observations 734 635 599 599
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Baseline Regression, low income
countries. Arellano-Bover
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini Lag 0.965∗∗ 0.906∗∗ 0.870∗∗ 0.861∗∗
(18.96) (15.66) (11.65) (12.08)
KA-Uribe 4.565∗∗ 3.217∗ 3.041∗ 1.961
(5.74) (2.42) (2.04) (1.18)
Inflation 0.00952 0.00968 0.00804
(1.41) (1.39) (1.26)
Trade -0.00753 -0.00538 -0.000666
(-0.94) (-0.84) (-0.10)
School Enrollment -0.0450∗ -0.0367 -0.0362
(-2.23) (-1.49) (-1.28)
Age dependency -0.0362 -0.0136 -0.00195
(-1.23) (-0.30) (-0.04)
Private Credit to GDP 0.0147 -0.0220
(0.66) (-0.59)
KA-Uribe*Privcredit 0.0488
(1.09)
Constant -1.020 7.755 6.791 6.768
(-0.45) (1.57) (1.25) (1.24)
Observations 327 184 184 184
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6: Baseline Regression, Middle income countries.
Arellano-Bover
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini Lag 0.917∗∗ 0.969∗∗ 0.941∗∗ 0.942∗∗
(14.16) (17.18) (18.35) (19.09)
KA-Uribe 0.108 -0.453 -0.616 -1.832+
(0.19) (-0.63) (-0.89) (-1.88)
Inflation 0.00122∗∗ 0.00149∗∗ 0.00166∗∗
(2.70) (3.05) (3.11)
Trade 0.00482 0.000530 0.00146
(0.70) (0.11) (0.28)
School Enrollment -0.0158 -0.0153 -0.00939
(-1.25) (-1.22) (-0.70)
Age dependency -0.00166 0.0155 0.0179
(-0.05) (0.48) (0.56)
Private Credit to GDP 0.0107 -0.00866
(1.55) (-0.79)
KA-Uribe*Privcredit 0.0351
(1.59)
Constant 3.609 2.367 2.525 2.457
(1.15) (0.82) (1.03) (1.07)
Observations 560 420 419 419
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Baseline Regression, High income countries. Arellano-Bover
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini Lag 0.894∗∗ 0.816∗∗ 0.784∗∗ 0.779∗∗
(50.45) (13.46) (12.22) (12.31)
KA-Uribe -0.218 -0.639∗ -0.613+ -2.731∗
(-0.30) (-2.04) (-1.85) (-2.48)
Inflation 0.0195∗∗ 0.0192∗∗ 0.0198∗∗
(8.16) (8.28) (7.42)
Trade -0.00318 -0.00228 -0.00172
(-0.79) (-0.61) (-0.44)
School Enrollment -0.0177∗ -0.0192∗ -0.0230∗
(-2.15) (-2.19) (-2.27)
Age dependency 0.00233 0.00682 0.0265
(0.15) (0.34) (1.20)
Private Credit to GDP 0.00164 -0.000689
(0.69) (-0.25)
KA-Uribe*PrivCredit 0.0171∗
(2.22)
Constant 4.272∗∗ 9.246∗∗ 10.19∗∗ 10.04∗∗
(6.01) (3.72) (4.09) (4.06)
Observations 576 503 468 468
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: Shocks and Interactions. All Sample. Arellano-Bover
Baseline RR Shocks Forecast error Bust Boom
Gini Lag 0.739∗∗ 0.734∗∗ 0.737∗∗ 0.735∗∗ 0.738∗∗
(40.46) (40.26) (40.41) (40.39) (40.35)
KA 1.107∗∗ 1.088∗∗ 1.124∗∗ 1.073∗∗ 1.057∗∗
(4.35) (4.28) (4.41) (4.22) (4.12)
Inflation 0.00284∗∗ 0.00289∗∗ 0.00280∗∗ 0.00274∗∗ 0.00284∗∗
(3.89) (3.97) (3.83) (3.77) (3.89)
Trade -0.0198∗∗ -0.0195∗∗ -0.0194∗∗ -0.0202∗∗ -0.0199∗∗
(-10.13) (-10.02) (-9.92) (-10.27) (-10.19)
School Enrollment -0.0121∗∗ -0.0122∗∗ -0.0125∗∗ -0.0121∗∗ -0.0119∗∗
(-2.86) (-2.88) (-2.95) (-2.87) (-2.81)
Age Dependency 0.000514 0.00184 0.000206 0.00204 0.000702
(0.07) (0.24) (0.03) (0.27) (0.09)
Private Credit to GDP 0.00824∗∗ 0.00839∗∗ 0.00822∗∗ 0.00878∗∗ 0.00823∗∗
(5.34) (5.46) (5.30) (5.66) (5.34)
RR Shocks 0.409∗
(2.09)
KA*RR Shocks -0.141
(-0.50)
forecast error 0.0200
(1.34)
KA*Forecast error -0.0456+
(-1.68)
Bust -0.252+
(-1.82)
KA*Bust 0.135
(0.71)
Boom -0.122
(-0.93)
KA*Boom 0.273
(1.43)
Constant 12.32∗∗ 12.41∗∗ 12.40∗∗ 12.42∗∗ 12.36∗∗
(12.69) (12.82) (12.78) (12.84) (12.73)
Observations 1664 1664 1664 1664 1664
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 9: Policy Changes. All Sample. Arellano-Bover
Baseline Dummy; closure RR Shocks
Gini Lag 0.739∗∗ 0.739∗∗ 0.735∗∗
(40.46) (40.49) (40.36)
KA 1.107∗∗ 1.136∗∗ 1.096∗∗
(4.35) (4.44) (4.30)
Inflation 0.00284∗∗ 0.00282∗∗ 0.00287∗∗
(3.89) (3.86) (3.94)
Trade -0.0198∗∗ -0.0197∗∗ -0.0195∗∗
(-10.13) (-10.06) (-9.99)
School Enrollment -0.0121∗∗ -0.0124∗∗ -0.0125∗∗
(-2.86) (-2.93) (-2.97)
Age dependency 0.000514 -0.0000144 0.00110
(0.07) (-0.00) (0.15)
Private Credit to GDP 0.00824∗∗ 0.00824∗∗ 0.00842∗∗
(5.34) (5.34) (5.48)
Close -0.254 -0.335
(-1.19) (-1.10)
RR Shocks -1.103
(-0.57)
Close*RR Shocks -1.421+
(-1.73)
Constant 12.32∗∗ 12.57∗∗ 12.76∗∗
(12.69) (12.65) (12.55)
Observations 1664 1664 1664
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 10: Program’s Age
Baseline Age Age and Interaction
Gini Lag 0.903∗∗ 0.881∗∗ 0.874∗∗
(46.91) (43.03) (42.38)
KA -0.778∗∗ -0.797∗∗ -1.457∗∗
(-2.71) (-2.81) (-4.62)
Inflation -0.00142 -0.00182 -0.00344+
(-0.74) (-0.96) (-1.77)
Trade -0.00974∗∗ -0.00782∗ -0.00649∗
(-3.14) (-2.50) (-2.06)
School Enrollment -0.0326∗∗ -0.0274∗∗ -0.0220∗
(-3.90) (-3.24) (-2.57)
Age dependency 0.0157 -0.000985 -0.00238
(0.87) (-0.05) (-0.13)
Private Credit to GDP 0.0213∗∗ 0.0210∗∗ 0.0203∗∗
(3.79) (3.77) (3.63)
Program’s age -0.0667∗∗ -0.330∗∗
(-3.06) (-5.71)
KA*Program’s Age 0.307∗∗
(4.92)
Constant 6.413∗∗ 8.232∗∗ 8.741∗∗
(4.10) (4.93) (5.19)
Observations 278 278 278
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 11: CCT Coverage
Baseline Coverage Coverage and Interaction
Gini Lag 0.903∗∗ 0.889∗∗ 0.894∗∗
(46.91) (42.43) (42.12)
KA -0.778∗∗ -0.624∗ -0.666∗
(-2.71) (-2.04) (-2.15)
Inflation -0.00142 -0.00169 -0.00223
(-0.74) (-0.93) (-1.21)
Trade -0.00974∗∗ -0.0121∗∗ -0.0103∗∗
(-3.14) (-3.57) (-2.99)
School Enrollment -0.0326∗∗ -0.0328∗∗ -0.0321∗∗
(-3.90) (-3.32) (-3.21)
Age dependency 0.0157 0.0221 0.0284
(0.87) (0.91) (1.15)
Private Credit to GDP 0.0213∗∗ 0.0183∗∗ 0.0147∗
(3.79) (3.01) (2.36)
CCT Coverage -0.0228∗∗ -0.116∗∗
(-4.48) (-4.67)
KA*CCT Coverage 0.102∗∗
(3.83)
Constant 6.413∗∗ 6.945∗∗ 6.338∗∗
(4.10) (3.51) (3.16)
Observations 278 191 191
Adjusted R2
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 12: Summary statistics for entire sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observations
KA-Uribe 0.354 0.346 1469
KA 0.538 0.369 2556
Gini 42.099 7.511 2676
RR Shocks 0.028 0.205 2676
Inflation 28.466 244.945 2418
De Facto 0.042 0.448 2533
Private Credit to GDP 49.48 47.17 2523
School Enrollment 76.862 31.275 2045
Trade 83.051 52.101 2623
Age dependency 63.834 18.446 2676
Real GDP growth 3.836 6.622 4460
Forecast error 0 4.575 4313
Table 13: Summary Statistics for Low Income Countries
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observations
KA-Uribe 0.556 0.349 329
KA 0.318 0.29 840
Gini 43.314 7.109 885
RR Shocks 0.036 0.21 885
Inflation 19.911 143.501 761
De Facto -0.02 0.254 828
Private Credit to GDP 19.703 18.232 816
School Enrollment 43.646 27.621 553
Trade 70.071 36.89 860
Age dependency 81.689 16.1 885
Real GDP Growth 4.155 5.828 859
Table 14: Summary Statistics for Middle In-
come Countries
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observations
KA-Uribe 0.436 0.346 562
KA 0.488 0.334 951
Gini 43.713 8.406 1003
RR Shocks 0.027 0.205 1003
Inflation 47.104 347.036 903
De Facto 0.024 0.311 954
Private Credit to GDP 41.44 30.618 974
School Enrollment 76.972 17.653 788
Trade 84.387 37.991 994
Age dependency 58.370 12.414 1003
Real GDP growth 4.098 4.824 979
Table 15: Summary Statistics for High Income Countries
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observations
KA-Uribe 0.16 0.224 578
KA 0.841 0.276 765
Gini 38.681 5.326 788
RR Shocks 0.02 0.198 788
Inflation 14.778 163.882 754
De Facto 0.132 0.686 751
Private Credit to GDP 93.313 55.238 733
School Enrollment 102.832 18.781 704
Trade 95.839 74.326 769
Age dependency 50.736 10.043 788
Real GDP growth 2.712 3.678 776
27
Countries in the Sample
Every year we use the income criteria (Section 3) to assign each country to their corresponding cluster. Tables 16-18
are snapshots of these groups for 1990, 2000, and 2010. Note that countries that do not appear in these particular years
may appear in other years. A country is excluded in a given year if it has a missing value for GDP per capita PPP data
to make an appropriate assessment of its income level.
Table 16: Country list: 1990
Low Income Middle Income High Income
Bangladesh Algeria Australia
Bolivia Botswana Austria
China (PRC) Brazil Belgium
Cote d’Ivoire Chile Canada
El Salvador Colombia Cyprus
Ethiopia Costa Rica Denmark
Ghana Dominican Republic Finland
Honduras Ecuador France
India Guatemala Germany
Indonesia Iran Greece
Kenya Israel Hong Kong (China)
Lesotho Jamaica Hungary
Malawi Jordan Ireland
Mali Malaysia Italy
Mauritania Mauritius Japan
Nigeria Mexico Netherlands
Pakistan Panama New Zealand
Philippines Paraguay Norway
Rwanda Peru Portugal
Sierra Leone Poland Singapore
Sri Lanka South Africa Spain
Uganda Thailand Sweden
Zimbabwe Trinidad and Tobago Switzerland
Tunisia United Kingdom
Turkey United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
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Table 17: Country list: 2000
Low Income Middle Income High Income
Armenia Albania Australia
Azerbaijan Algeria Austria
Bangladesh Barbados Belgium
Bolivia Belarus Canada
Burkina Faso Bosnia and Herzegovina Cyprus
Burundi Botswana Czech Republic
Cambodia Brazil Denmark
Cameroon Bulgaria Finland
Central African Republic Chile France
China Colombia Germany
Cote d’Ivoire Costa Rica Greece
Djibouti Croatia Hong Kong
Ethiopia Dominican Republic Iceland
Gambia Ecuador Ireland
Georgia El Salvador Israel
Ghana Estonia Italy
Guinea Fiji Japan
Guinea-Bissau Guatemala Netherlands
Guyana Hungary New Zealand
Haiti Indonesia Norway
Honduras Iran, Islamic Republic of Portugal
India Jamaica Singapore
Kenya Jordan Slovenia
Kyrgyz Republic Kazakhstan Spain
Lesotho Latvia Sweden
Madagascar Lebanon Switzerland
Malawi Lithuania United Kingdom
Mali Macedonia United States
Mauritania Malaysia
Moldova Mauritius
Mongolia Mexico
Morocco Namibia
Mozambique Panama
Nepal Paraguay
Nicaragua Peru
Niger Poland
Nigeria Russia
Pakistan Slovakia
Papua New Guinea South Africa
Philippines Sri Lanka
Rwanda St. Lucia
Senegal Suriname
Sierra Leone Swaziland
Tajikistan Thailand
Tanzania Trinidad and Tobago
Uganda Tunisia
Ukraine Turkey
Uzbekistan Turkmenistan
Vietnam Uruguay
Zambia Venezuela
Zimbabwe
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Table 18: Country list: 2010
Low Income Middle Income High Income
Afghanistan Armenia Australia
Bangladesh Barbados Austria
Ethiopia Belarus Belgium
Honduras Bhutan Canada
India Bolivia Cyprus
Kyrgyz Republic Brazil Czech Republic
Madagascar Bulgaria Denmark
Malawi Chile Estonia
Mali China Finland
Moldova Colombia France
Nepal Costa Rica Germany
Pakistan Croatia Greece
Rwanda Dominican Republic Hong Kong
Senegal Ecuador Hungary
Sierra Leone El Salvador Iceland
Tanzania Georgia Ireland
Togo Guatemala Israel
Uganda Indonesia Italy
Vietnam Iran, Islamic Republic of Japan
Zambia Jordan Lithuania
Zimbabwe Kazakhstan Malaysia
Latvia Malta
Macedonia Netherlands
Maldives New Zealand
Mexico Norway
Mongolia Poland
Namibia Portugal
Nigeria Russia
Panama Singapore
Paraguay Slovakia
Peru Slovenia
Philippines Spain
South Africa Sweden
Sri Lanka Switzerland
Thailand United Kingdom
Tunisia United States
Turkey
Ukraine
Uruguay
Venezuela
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